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We have developed a first of its kind methodology for
deriving bandwidth prices for premium direct peering
between Access ISPs (A-ISPs) and Content and Ser-
vice Providers (CSPs) that want to deliver content and
services in premium quality. Our methodology estab-
lishes a direct link between service profitability, e.g.,
from advertising, user- and subscriber-loyalty, intercon-
nection costs, and finally bandwidth price for peering.
Unlike existing work in both the networking and eco-
nomics literature, our resulting computational model
built around Nash bargaining, can be used for deriving
quantitative results comparable to actual market prices.
We analyze the US market and derive prices for video
that compare favorably with existing prices for transit
and paid peering. We also observe that the fair prices
returned by the model for high-profit/low-volume ser-
vices such as search, are orders of magnitude higher
than current bandwidth prices. This implies that re-
solving existing (fierce) interconnection tussles may re-
quire per service, instead of wholesale, peering between
A-ISPs and CSPs. Our model can be used for deriving
initial benchmark prices for such negotiations.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are many “tussles” [7] affecting the Internet,
ranging across regulation, privacy, network intercon-
nection, and pricing. The economics of peering [39],
is among the thorniest, but yet, least understood ones.
The term peering refers to the interconnection between
networks for the purpose of exchanging traffic directly
between them. Classic unpaid peering played a crucial
role in the evolution of the Internet. It was usually
set up between local access ISPs (or regional tier-2 net-
works) of similar size for the purpose of avoiding charges
and longer paths through upstream “transit” providers.
The rationale behind such interconnection agreements
was that since the involved networks exchanged compa-
rable traffic volumes, there was no issue of who should
pay whom.
This has changed recently with the establishment
of peering between dissimilar networks, namely Access
ISPs (A-ISPs) and Content and Service Providers
(CSPs). Whereas classic unpaid peering between
A-ISPs was targeting transit cost reduction, the
peering between A-ISPs and CSPs is primarily driven
by the need to offer premium quality, i.e., low latency
and high bandwidth to traffic and revenue generating
services such as video, search, online social networks,
and gaming. Such a premium peering may include a
well provisioned interconnection at various Internet
Exchange Points (IXPs), CDN hosting of the CSP’s
content inside the A-ISP, and even packet level pri-
oritization to avoid congestion at the access part of
the network and especially on the last mile. Comcast
and Netflix recently signed such a premium agreement,
but although there are several (and in many cases
controversial) reports attempting to estimate the exact
bandwidth price derived by that deal 1, the involved
parties have not published any official report regarding
their agreement.
The problem. Classic unpaid peering was justified
on the basis of traffic symmetry, which no longer
exists since CSPs inject into A-ISPs several orders of
magnitude more traffic (e.g., video) than they receive
from them (effectively just requests) [12, 27]. This has
opened the door to fierce conflicts between A-ISPs and
CSPs about who should pay whom and at what rate.
The recent disagreement between Free and Google is
a good example [45]. The main battleground for such
conflicts is NANOG.2 Therein peering coordinators
have been arguing about payments and have tried
to relate them to the question of “who benefits the
most from the premium peering? ”. They have focused
mainly on benefits from reduced transit costs [39] and
have largely left untouched the question of “who can
monetize better the superior traffic delivery quality? ”.
The research literature on networks and economics
has developed models of the problem that capture both
transit cost savings and monetization of QoE but has
1http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/02/heres-comcast-
netflix-deal-structured-numbers.html
2www.nanog.org
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derived mostly qualitative conclusions. Indeed, as it will
be elaborated later (Sect. ??) such models miss many
of the important details of the conflict, as prices are
derived based on a bilateral basis rather than in a com-
petitive market. Moreover, they are not driven by real
data, and hence, cannot derive quantitative results, i.e.,
actual prices for premium peering. Consequently, such
models cannot be validated, nor can they be used for
deriving actual prices to be used in peering negotiations.
Motivated by the above, we propose a first-of-its-kind
framework capable to analyze premium peerings quan-
titatively. Our model establishes a direct link between
service profitability, distribution costs, and ultimately
bandwidth price. It suggests that the way forward and
away from existing tussles is to perform per service peer-
ing. As with other economic models of the Internet,
several questions emerge. Can the model capture the
essential dynamics of the Internet ecosystem without
becoming computationally intractable? Can the basic
parameters of the model be extracted from real world
publicly available data? Last, can the results derived
by the model be validated against reality?
Our contributions. Our main contribution is a
methodology leading to a computational model with
the properties mentioned above that can be used by
A-ISPs and CSPs as a benchmark to derive initial
prices for their negotiations around paid peering. We
have implemented our model and released a web-site
that allows for the analysis of arbitrary markets beyond
the one examined in Sect. 6. Specific contributions can
be broken down as follows:
• Modeling: Unlike prior work on peering that in-
cludes transit ISPs [31], we focus on the bilateral rela-
tionship between A-ISPs and CSPs. In the context of
this relationship, we model both costs (e.g., for the ex-
tra ports needed for direct peering) and new profits due
to improved QoE that translates into increased engage-
ment time of existing customers, and positive (incom-
ing) churn of new customers taken from competitors.
Such positive, incoming, churn benefits both the A-ISP
and the CSP, whereas the increased engagement time
can typically be monetized only by CSPs (since A-ISP
offer typically flat contracts for wired broadband [28]).
Capturing ISP- and CSP-side churn poses major model-
ing challenges. One of our main modeling contribution
is a churn model across different services and ISPs that
is reasonably close to reality while remaining computa-
tionally feasible (Sect. 3). We allocate the total surplus
by solving a Nash bargaining problem which outputs
fair side-payments that can, in turn, be translated into
per bit prices for premium peering. The Nash bargain-
ing solution effectively compares the profit of players
when they act in isolation vs. when they cooperate and
allocates the extra profit accordingly.
• Data driven approach: We were able to populate
most of the parameters of the proposed model with real-
world data. A methodological contribution of this work
is that populating economic models of the Internet with
real data is difficult but not infeasible, at least to a
certain level of accuracy that may still produce usable
quantitative results. For example we were able to in-
troduce in the model real data for cost of peering, ISP
and CSP market shares and profit margins, per service
engagement time and sensitivity to QoE, etc. (Sect. 5).
Of course, some parameters are more difficult to set
than others, e.g., loyalty factors, so we had for some
cases to analyse alternative scenarios with respect to
such parameters to check the robustness of our results.
• Practical takeways: We run our model for the US
market and analyze the results. Our findings show that:
– CSPs have more ways to monetize improved QoE
and thus in most cases they are the ones that pay for
premium peering. Indeed, assuming a similar level of
customer loyalty on the A-ISP and CSP markets, the
CSP always has the extra benefit of being able to mon-
etize further the premium peering by increasing the
engagement time of its existing users and then turn-
ing that into additional revenue, through advertising or
paid subscriptions. On the other hand, in view of flat
broadband contracts, A-ISPs currently do not have any
means to monetize improved QoE.
– Large ISPs typically receive payments from CSPs for
premium peering whereas smaller ones may offer it for
free or even pay for it. The reason is that the only
benefit for ISPs relates to churn. An ISP that connects
to the content and services of a popular CSP through a
premium peering connection can use the superior QoE
to attract customers from competing ISPs. This creates
new revenues for the ISP but their extent depends on
the market size already captured. A large ISP that
already holds a sizable part of the market has a smaller
pool from which it could attract new customers. If the
ISP is small, however, then a premium peering allows
it to increase its revenues substantially by attracting a
large number of new customers from competitors that
do not currently offer premium peering. In that case it
is to the best-interest of the small ISP to offer premium
peering for free or even pay the CSP for it.
– Customer loyalty and the ability to translate improved
QoE into CSP-side revenues affect the volume and even
the directionality of payments. The previous observa-
tions assumes a balanced level of loyalty between ISPs
and CSPs. If any of the two sides has a substantially
higher “lock-in” on its customers then this can have a
profound impact on the price of premium peering, and
even change the directionality of payments. Lock-in’s
on the ISP can be due to brand power or fixed term con-
tracts with disconnection penalties. For CSPs, lock-in
can result from the uniqueness of a service or content,
the effort already put in learning and customizing it, or
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from externalities (e.g.., in social networks and gaming).
Whatever the reason, if users on one side of the market
are more loyal than on the opposite side, then they will
reduce the revenues from incoming churn and induce the
Nash bargaining solution to compensate by transferring
payments from the other side of the market. The final
outcome depends jointly on the aforementioned imbal-
ance and the ability of the CSP to monetize QoE.
– Timing matters and first movers have the advantage.
We observe that the post-peering profits for an A-ISP
are highly sensitive to what other pairs have established
before. The reason is that the first premium peering
deals have a larger potential to attract new customers
from competitors, whereas late deals are more of a de-
fensive move for retaining new customers rather than
bringing new ones. The magnitude of the economic im-
pact is substantial (20% in our case study).
– Balancing the interconnection economics will require
per service peering. Our case study of the US market
indicates that a fair monthly payment from Google to
Comcast for premium peering across all services would
cost somewhere in the vicinity of $9.5M and this seems
to be stable across much of the parameter space. Break-
ing down this aggregate payment into per service pay-
ments and dividing by the generated bandwidth of each
service we were able to derive a $ value per Gbps per
month for each service. It turns out that the fair band-
width price predicted by our model for video is between
$0.5K–$1K per Gbps per month which is remarkably
close to real transit and paid peering prices from the
US market. On the other hand, the Gbps per month $
value predicted for search, is orders of magnitude higher
than current bandwidth prices. This effectively means
that current prices are fair for high bandwidth but low
revenue per bit services like video but far from fair for
high revenue services such as search. Trying to price
fairly amorphous bandwidth that includes such strik-
ingly different constituents might be one of the main
reasons for the inability to reach a consensus between
A-ISPs and CSPs about what constitutes a fair price.
A practical takeway from our work is that per service
peering might help in resolving the tussle.
2. THE SYNERGY OF A-ISP AND CSPS
In this section we first explain why we focus on peer-
ing issues between A-ISPs and CSPs, then move to de-
fine what premium peering is, and finally discuss the
consequences of failing to establish one.
Why we focus on A-ISPs and CSPs? Both the
A-ISPs and CSPs markets have consolidated in the
last decade: the 10 largest telecom operators in the
world provide access to more than 2B subscribers [44],
whereas the 10 largest CSPs amount to more than 63%
of the time US users spend online [35]. Thus, it suffices
to establish a small set of agreements for premium
peering directly between leading A-ISPs and CSPs,
guaranteeing that most of the content meets most of
the eyeballs through highly provisioned, congestion
free, low-delay paths. Furthermore, the content and
service discussed here can be replicated in CDNs and
clouds close to the end users, from where it is both
cheaper and faster to deliver. Combining the “repli-
cability” of content and services with consolidation
seems to indicate that the bulk of content will flow
directly between A-ISPs and CSPs whereas T-ISPs will
handle long-haul communication (email, voip, etc.),
long-tail content distribution (smaller A-ISPs, CSPs),
and backup paths (for both small and large A-ISPs,
CSPs). We therefore focus on the relationship between
A-ISPs and CSPs whose synergy is essential for high
quality content distribution. In the latter category we
collapse all possible actors such as media creators (e.g.,
YouTube), distributors (e.g., NetFlix), CDNs (e.g.,
Akamai), and content-heavy tier-1 ISPs (e.g., Level-3).
We model customers and advertisers through their
contribution, via payments, to the profits of A-ISPs
and CSPs, respectively.
Since T-ISPs can be bypassed, payments for transit
are replaced by payments for direct premium peering
between A-ISPs and CSPs.
Premium peering. A premium peering includes some
or all of the following: 1) a well provisioned direct peer-
ing between the A-ISP and the CSP at multiple points
(IXPs, colocation providers, etc.), 2) some form of host-
ing in CDN nodes deep inside the A-ISP and close to
the end users (e.g., next to DSLAMs), which on the
one hand improves the quality of delivery, and on the
other reduces drastically the delivery costs, and 3) link
level prioritization of the said traffic from the point of
entry until the customer so that it cannot be obstructed
by congestion in the last few links (e.g., edge router to
DSLAM, or the last mile).
What happens if QoE is not available? A-ISPs are
claiming that without premium peering revenues they
do not have a viable business model [1] for upgrading
their infrastructures to handle the growth of traffic [6].
In that case, the quality of the content will have to be
downgraded to avoid poor Quality of Experience (QoE)
due to congestion, e.g., video might have to be encoded
at a lower rate or smaller format. For delay sensitive
applications such as gaming or browsing of complicated
social networks sites, interactivity will be hampered.
All of the above have negative consequences for both
A-ISPs and CSPs:
A-ISP churn. If an A-ISP does not offer high quality
access to the content of a popular CSP, whereas its com-
petitors in the same geographic area do, then it risks
losing a number of customers. Such customers would
primarily be those that draw high value from accessing
the said content.
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CSP churn. Failing to establish a premium connec-
tion is detrimental to the CSPs as well. The reason is
that advertisers want to place ads at web sites of CSPs
that attract many eyeballs for substantial time. Indeed,
there have been several studies connecting the QoE with
the amount of time that users spend on a site [24].
Having a non-premium, i.e., best-effort connection to
the eyeballs and, for example, experience pauses while
streaming video, will deter some from spending time
at the site or visiting it at all. Hence, customers and
thus ad revenue will move to competitor CSPs that have
managed to establish premium peerings with A-ISPs.
In the next sections we build our model for pricing
bilateral peering contracts. We start first with modeling
the dynamics of churn.
3. CHURN MODEL
In this section, we propose a formal model that cap-
tures both A-ISP and CSP churn and also considers the
fact of how important a service is for end users. Before
presenting the details of the model, we next describe
the essence of our churn model. We assume that cus-
tomers switch A-ISPs and CSPs in a probabilistic fash-
ion (i.e., flip coins to decide) according to rules we will
disclose later on. Customer churn occurs each time the
state of the network connectivity is changed. This in-
volves premium peering to be established (or removed)
between an A-ISP and a CSP. In such a case, all the
services offered by the given CSP to the customers of
the A-ISP, change quality from best-effort to premium
(or the reverse). We compute the customer transitions3
in two steps. In the first phase, customers decide to
switch A-ISPs because other A-ISPs offer some service,
for which they really care, in premium quality. In the
second phase, customers within the same A-ISP switch
CSPs for the services they are interested in and which
are now offered with higher quality by a different CSP.
Once these two transitions take place the ecosystem is
in equilibrium and will be perturbed again when the
network connectivity changes. We proceed by defining
precisely our churn model for customers.
3.1 Definitions
Let ISP denote the set of A-ISPs on the market
while let CSP be the set of CSPs. We arbitrarily
order the K different services of the service set S as
(1, 2, . . . ,K) (i.e., service 1 is video, etc.). As a first
approximation, to describe the service preferences of
a customer, we define its ‘generic’ type T to be the
vector of (T1, T2, . . . , TK), where the kth component
Tk ∈ CSP defines the CSP providing the kth service
to the customer of the specific type. Let T be the set
of possible generic types. If a customer is of type T ,
3Throughout the paper, we use the terms transition, switch,
and churn interchangeably.
we know the CSPs she is using for his services.
We now refine our type definition to include the iden-
tity of the most valued service for customers of this
generic type (e.g., video is the most valued service of the
customer of that generic type). The key idea is to refine
the type as little as possible, while capturing the most
important aspects of customer differentiation within the
same type. The main reason for this is complexity. By
doing so we reduce the set of possible customer types,
while keeping the ‘first-order’ information for motivat-
ing customer transitions between A-ISPs and CSPs.
Our new complete definition of a customer type be-
comes (i, (s, T )) where i ∈ ISP , s ∈ {1, . . . ,K} denotes
the most valuable service in this sub-type and T ∈ T .
The state of the type (i, (s, T )) corresponds to the num-
ber N(i, (s, T )) of customers of that type at ISP i.
Note that there are at most K|CSP |K customer
types per ISP. If we were to capture the whole ordering
of the popularity of the services instead of keeping
the most important one, the number of different types
would be larger by a factor of (K − 1)!. For example,
for |ISP | = 4, |CSP | = 4, K = 5, we get about 20000
types over all ISPs instead of 480000.
Toy example. We illustrate our ecosystem and the
types of the customers in a toy example. Let us con-
sider a market where there are two A-ISPs, two CSPs,
and two services, namely, search and video. Let us as-
sume that this market has 300 customers in total. We
assume that A-ISP1 has 2/5 of the access market, CSP1
provides search for 2/3 of the users and its video ser-
vice is used by 2/5 of the users. We further assume that
search is the most important service for 3/4 of the users.
Distributing the customers based on these ratios yields
the state of the different types as we depict in Figure 1.
The figure also reveals—via its color-coding—the way
how the users can be summarized for a specific service,
for a given service of a CSP, or for a CSP itself.
3.2 Transition of customers
We define now the transitions between the states of
customer types. Such transitions occur (i) because cus-
tomers find their preferred service being offered by the
same CSP at premium quality at a new A-ISP, or (ii)
because at their current A-ISP the quality of their pre-
ferred service became available at a higher level by an
other CSP. Hence, the transitions of the customers are
motivated by changes of quality only regarding the cus-
tomers’ preferred service. In all cases, a customer’s pre-
ferred service category remains the same (e.g., if video
is the customer’s most valued service, this remains the
case during all the transitions), whereas the customer
may change its A-ISP or CSP. Therefore, in case of (i), a
customer is keeping the same (s, T ) and just switches its
A-ISPs. In case (ii), the customer changes type within
the same A-ISP, by only changing the CSP of her pre-
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Figure 1: Toy example: the distribution of users among different
types based on their most important service, their A-ISPs, and their
CSPs used for the different services. The y-axis corresponds to the
preferred services. For example, there are 27 users of A-ISP2 who are
interested in search, and use CSP-2 as their search and video provider
(bottom left type). Similarly, 4 users have A-ISP1 as access provider,
their most important service is video, they use CSP2 as their search
provider, and they use the video services of CSP1 (second type in the
top left).
ferred service. By defining the corresponding transition
probabilities, the transitions of the various types are
straightforward since we keep track the number of cus-
tomers of each type per A-ISP. We next describe the
customer churn if a premium peering is established.
Phase 1: churn across A-ISPs. If A-ISP j and
CSP x establish a premium peering, the customers tran-
sition from type (i, (s, T )) to type (j, (s, T )). Let n1 =
N(i, (s, T )) and n2 = N(j, (s, T )) denote the number of
customers that A-ISP i and j have in the given types,
respectively. We determine the transition of the cus-
tomers along the following rules:
1. The transition of customers occurs only if Ts = x
and A-ISP i, had no premium peering with CSP
x.
2. The probability of transition is γ = (1−β(i))h(s),
where β(i) is the stickiness (i.e., loyalty) to A-
ISP i and h(s) is the probability of customers who
mainly care about service s (e.g., video) to switch
ISPs because the quality of s is improved.
3. As a result of the state transition, the number of
churning customers is ∆ = n1γ, hence the new
states become N(i, (s, T )) = n1 −∆ and
N(j, (s, T ), ) = n2 +∆, respectively.
Phase 2: churn across CSPs. If A-ISP i and CSP
x establish a premium connection, the customers churn
from type (i, (s, T )) to type (i, (s, T ′)), where T ′s = x
and Ts 6= y hold. If the starting states of these types are
63 99
42 66
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Figure 2: The churn of customers between types if A-ISP1 and CSP1
establish a premium peering. Phase 1: churn from A-ISP2 to A-ISP1.
Phase 2 (dashed arrows): churn from CSP2 to CSP1.
N(i, (s, T )) = n1 and N(i, (s, T ′)) = n2, we compute
the volume of churning customers as follows:
1. The transition of customers occurs only if CSP Ts
has no existing premium peering agreement with
A-ISP i.
2. The probability of the churn is γ = (1−θ(Ts))g(s)
where θ(Ts) is the stickiness to CSP Ts and g(s)
is the probability for customers that mainly care
about service s (e.g., video) to switch CSPs be-
cause the quality of s improves.
3. The number of transitioning customers is ∆ =
n1γ; the new states become N(i, (s, T )) = n1 −∆
and N(i, (s, T ′)) = n2 +∆, respectively.
Toy example. We use the same market we depicted
in Figure 1 to illustrate the steps of our churn model.
The value of the states represent the number of cus-
tomers after the churn, while the labels of the arrows
indicate the volume of switching customers. We assume
that 1/3 of the customers switch their A-ISPs while a
CSP with premium services captures 1/2 of the users.
If A-ISP1 and CSP1 set up a premium peering, due to
premium quality customers of A-ISP2 churn to A-ISP1
(phase 1). In the figure we show which types are af-
fected: video-enthusiastic customers who are using the
video service of CSP1, and search-eager customers who
are using the search engine of CSP1. The second ef-
fect of the premium peering is that some customers of
A-ISP1 change their current CSP to access their most
important service in premium quality. We show with
dashed arrows the types from which customers churn:
a fraction of the customers who care for video (search)
churn from CSP2 to the video (search) service of CSP1.
4. COMPUTING THE PRICE OF PRE-
MIUM PEERING
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u(i),n(i) R(s),a(s),ρ(s),τ(s),ϕ(s),
Figure 3: A premium peering scenario with the parameters of the
actors. The traffic flows directly between A-ISP i and CSP x if they
set up premium peering.
We now introduce an economic framework for
computing fair peering prices. Our analysis captures
the revenues and the expenditures of an ISP and a
CSP both before and after they establish a premium
peering agreement, taking also into account customer
churn. We illustrate the market scenario along with
the appropriate parameters of the stakeholders in
Figure 3. Initially, the traffic flows between A-ISP
i and the CSP x throughout a transit ISP (T-ISP),
while under a premium peering this traffic will flow
directly between them. To analyse the economic gains
from premium peering we need to define the revenues
and expenditures of the actors before and after the
agreement. We use the ‘ˆ ’ notation to distinguish the
various quantities after peering from the respective
values before peering is established .
4.1 Profits before peering
For A-ISP i, let u(i) denote the profit per customer,
n(i) =
∑
s,T N(i, (s, T )) the total number customers,
and n(i)ξ=x =
∑
s,T |Tξ=x
N(i, (s, T )) the number of
customers that subscribe for service ξ to CSP x.
CSPs have two main sources of income: subscrip-
tion fees and advertisement-based revenue. If R(s) =
profit per customer subscribing to service s (assumed
uniform across CSPs), the total subscription related
profit of CSP x from the customer base of ISP i is∑
ξ∈S R(ξ)n(i)ξ=x.
The advertisement profit of a CSP is a product of
τ(s), the engagement time (e.g., minutes) of the cus-
tomers, i.e., the time the customers spend using service
s, ρ(s), the rate of the clicks4 of the advertisements in
case of service s, and a(s), the profit per click in case
of service s.
Without a peering agreement, A-ISP i and CSP x
have to pay for transit, being charged the product of
the traffic volume and the unit price of the transit ser-
vice. Let ϕ(s), t(i), t(x) denote the average traffic rate
4or impressions depending on the scheme of the advertise-
ment campaign
required per user engagement time of service s and the
unit cost of transit (e.g., per Mbps) for A-ISP i and
CSP x, respectively. Then, summing up all the traffic
originating from the services of CSP x and terminating
at A-ISP i, the total expenditure of A-ISP i is:
ct(i) = t(i)
∑
ξ∈S
ϕ(ξ)τ(ξ)n(i)ξ=x ,
and similarly for CSP x the transit cost is
ct(x) = t(x)
∑
ξ∈S
ϕ(ξ)τ(ξ)n(i)ξ=x .
Based on the above, the profits of A-ISP i
and CSP x before the peering agreement are
respectively Vi = n(i)u(i) − ct(i) and Vx =∑
ξ∈S (R (ξ) + a (ξ) ρ (ξ) τ (ξ))n(i)ξ=x − ct(x). These
expressions contain solely the monetary aspect of the
relation between the two actors i, x, i.e., they do not
include the revenues and expenditures related to the
other A-ISPs and CSPs present in the market since
these are not affected by premium peering.
4.2 Profits after peering
If the A-ISP and the CSP agree to engage in a pre-
mium peering, their profits change due to three reasons.
First, the cost of transmitting the data between the par-
ties changes. They do not incur anymore transit cost
but need to pay for the new costs of peering cp(i) and
cp(x) respectively, for A-ISP i and CSP x 5.
Second, customers are becoming more engaged with
the services of the CSP if the services are accessible
in premium quality. The enhanced quality may affect
all the parameters of the CSPs’ revenue streams: the
profit per customer paying subscription fees (Rˆ(s)), the
engagement time of the customers (τˆ (s)), the rate of
clicks (ρˆ(s)), and the profit per click (aˆ(s)). Moreover,
enhanced quality services may impose additional traffic
loads (ϕˆ(s)). On the A-ISP side, the profit per customer
could also change due to the improved quality (uˆ(i)).
Third, the improved quality acts as a driving force
for the churn of the customers, as we discussed it in
details in Section 3 for calculating the new values of
Nˆ(i, (s, T )). Our post-peering values of the profits for
A-ISP i and CSP x become Vˆi = nˆ(i)uˆ(i) − cp(i) and
Vˆx =
∑
ξ∈S
(
Rˆ (ξ) + aˆ (ξ) ρˆ (ξ) τˆ (ξ)
)
nˆ(i)ξ=x−cp(x) re-
spectively.
5The peering costs of the actors are not necessarily identi-
cal although both parties handle the same amount of traf-
fic. For example, one of them may face a collocation cost to
build into the peering facility (e.g., into a public IXP) where
the other party is already present. The cost of the peering
depends on several factors like the volume of the traffic, col-
location needs, and whether the peering agreement includes
a CDN service provided by the A-ISP.
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4.3 Nash bargaining solution
Based on the profits of the actors before and after
the premium peering, we quantify the total monetary
benefit of the peering agreement as
U = Vˆi − Vi + Vˆx − Vx . (1)
If U is negative, then trivially there is no sense to make
such an agreement, and if positive, as result of their co-
operation, it should be shared among them. We use the
Nash Bargaining solution [16] as a concept to define fair
profit allocations when the possible actions of the play-
ers are to establish the peering connection at a specific
level of QoS or not peer at all. We assume that each
player has an equal urge to settle the negotiations and
that arbitrary monetary transfers are possible (i.e., that
after peering the players can pay each other any amount
that they have agreed upon). This assumption to allow
for an arbitrary payment among the actors simplifies
our solution concept tremendously; the solution is to
peer if there are positive total profits, and compute the
monetary transfers to ensure that each player obtains
equal extra profits computed on top of her fall back
solution profits (not peer at all, if negotiations brake).
Formally, we like to find the fair new total profits zi and
zx for the two actors by solving
max
zi+zx=U
(zi − Vi) (zx − Vx) . (2)
Once we obtain the net fair profits, we compute the
respective payment from CSP to ISP as Vˆx − zx, which
can be positive or negative. The interpretation is that
if under a fair arbitration, CSP x should end up with
a net profit of zx that is less than her realised profit
Vˆx after peering (with no side payments to the ISP), he
should turn back to the ISP the part of the profit that
is above the fair amount. The same results values but
with an opposite sign follow if we consider the case of
the payment from the ISP to the CSP. In our case the
fair payment wx is
wx =
1
2
[
(Vˆx − Vx)− (Vˆi − Vi)
]
. (3)
The solution definition guarantees that if the peering
results to a positive surplus U ≥ 0, none of participants
end up with less profit than they would realise before
the establishment of the premium peering.
5. PARAMETERIZATION OF THE MODEL
In this section, we apply the proposed model quan-
titatively to investigate the derived premium peering
prices in the U.S. Internet ecosystem.
Based on real datasets, we present the assumptions
we make on the parameters of the model. Initially,
we distinguish two types of assumptions: modeling and
parameterization assumptions. The modeling assump-
tions reduce the the parameter state size by claiming
sameness of some metrics, while for the parameteriza-
tion assumptions we use real-world datasets in order
to assign reasonable values to the model’s parameters.
Furthermore, we classify the various assumptions in four
different sets: Services assumptions (Section 5.1), CSPs
assumptions (Section 5.2), A-ISPs assumptions (Section
5.3)and General market assumptions (Section 5.4). In
the following Tables (Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Ta-
ble 4), we summarize the considered assumptions, be-
fore proceeding to the justification of our parameteriza-
tion.
Services’ parameters subsection
Probability of A-ISP churn 5.1.1
Probability of CSP churn 5.1.1
Before peering traffic rates 5.1.2
After peering traffic rates 5.1.2
Before peering engagement times 5.1.2
After peering engagement times 5.1.2
Relative Importance 5.1.2
Table 1: Modeling and parameterization assumptions for services.
CSPs’ parameters subsection
CSP stickiness assumptions 5.2.1
Post peering advertising rates 5.2.1
Market shares 5.2.2
Estimation of CSP stickiness 5.2.2
Table 2: Modeling and parameterization assumptions for CSPs.
A-ISPs’ parameters Subsection
A-ISP stickiness assumptions 5.3.1
Number of subscribers and annual profits 5.3.2
Estimation of CSP stickiness 5.3.2
Table 3: Modeling and parameterization assumptions for A-ISPs.
General parameters Subsection
Market conditions 5.4.1
Transit and peering costs 5.4.2
Table 4: General parameters
5.1 Services
We assume that a premium peering deal includes at
most, the following four types of services: video, online
social network, search, and gaming. This assumption
is motivated by the fact that the aforementioned ser-
vices cover most of the time an average end-user spends
online, while capturing more than 70% of the online
advertisement-based revenues in 2013 [21], under the
assumption that Display/Banner and Rich Media ad-
formats, fall in any of these types of services.
Furthermore, we distinguish the video services in
two sub-types: user-centric video, and commercial
based video services such as online movies and TV
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shows. The main reason for this distinction is that
user-centric video is mainly delivered by CSPs whose
profits are based on advertisements, while CSPs that
deliver movies or TV series are financially based on
monthly subscription fees. Moreover the duration (and
hence the end-users’ engagement times) for user-centric
content is significantly smaller in comparison with
online movies.
5.1.1 Modelling assumptions
Initially we assume that end-users’ favorite type of
service falls in any of the aformentioned service cate-
gories, e.g., can be either search or video or osn or gam-
ing. Furthermore, we attempt to capture the inherent
characteristics of each service, that differentiates itself
from all the other services. Thus, we assume that the
probabilities of churn are not equal for the various ser-
vices, but increasing in a linear manner, such that the
sum of the churn probabilities of the various services is
equal to 1.
Probability of A-ISP churn. The probability of the
A-ISP churn (h(s)), increases in the following order of
the services: search, video, OSN, gaming. In case of
gaming, two factors promote the churn of a user to a
new A-ISP: the network effect of its friends playing with
and the cost of the gaming console. In case of OSN, the
network effect increases the churn probability, while the
power of a video service is related to the variety of its
available content. Finally, the search engines can be
replaced in the easiest way as far as the usability aspect
is concerned, as long as the search results are relevant.
As explained before, the increase is linear: h(search)+
3µ = h(video) + 2µ = h(osn) + µ = h(gaming) = h.
We use h = 0.4 and µ = 0.1 as parameters.
Probability of CSP churn. Similar trends are con-
sidered in case of the probability of the CSP churn
(g(s)). However, in this case the order of the services
reverses, e.g., replacing the search engine has the high-
est probability. Here we assume again a linear relation
between the services: g(gaming) + 3ν = g(osn) + 2ν =
g(video) + ν = g(search) = g. We use g = 0.4 and
ν = 0.1 as parameters.
5.1.2 Parameterization assumptions
We use real-world datasets in order to assign reason-
able values to the model’s parameters. Hence, we apply
the forthcoming parameterization to analyze the peer-
ing decisions of A- ISPs and CSPs.
Importance of services. As Nielsen [36] points out,
in 2010 end-users spent 6.01 minutes for online gaming
services per day. Assuming that online gaming hours up
6% year-over-year [47], it appears that current online
gaming engagement times are 7.45 minutes per day.
We use the minutes end-users spend on Netflix,
Youtube, Google search and Facebook as proxies for
Service Relative importance
User-centric Video 14.69%
Online social networks 18.95%
Search 8.36%
Gaming 9.27%
Commercial-based video 48.73%
Table 5: Importance of services based on spent time
estimating the daily engagement times for commercial-
based video, user-centric video, search and online social
network services respectively. Based on [4], it turns
out that on average, end-users spend 11.8 minutes per
day on Youtube and 15.2 minutes per day on Facebook.
In the case of online movies, it has been estimated
that subscribers of Netflix spend around 103 minutes
per day on online views [29]. As the market coverage
of Netflix in the U.S. market is around 38% [38], we
conclude that on average, users spend 39.14 minutes
per day on online movies. Finally for online search, we
assume that end-users spend around 6.72 minutes of
their online time per day (see for example [19]).
Given that the time the customers spend online de-
scribes accurately the importance of the service cate-
gories, we present in Table 5, the relative importance of
each service.
Traffic rates before a premium peering agree-
ment. As major online video providers (such as Net-
flix and Amazon), use Adaptive Bit Rate streaming 6,
we assume that the average download traffic rates for
commercial-based video, are on average 22.5 MB/min
(average DVD quality). Based on 7 and assuming that
on average end-users watch user-centric video services
on 480p encoding, or 7.5 MB per minute of engagement
time.
For computing the traffic rates of online social net-
work services we user the report of Sandvine [42]. The
median monthly consumption of north american fixed
accesses was 19.4 GB, and during the peak hours Face-
book accounted for the 1.99% of the total traffic, and
hence we assume that the average traffic for this type
of service is 0.84 MB/min per user.
The traffic of online gaming is 0.12% of the traffic
of video according to [6], and assuming similar traffic
volume for search as the gaming one, it is derived that
the traffic rates for online gaming are 0.051 MB/min,
and 0.054 MB/min for search.
Post-peering traffic rates. We assume that the post
peering quality of the user-centric video increases from
480p to 720p, resulting 2.1-time larger traffic rate:
ϕˆ(user − centric video) = 2.1ϕ(user − centric video).
Furthermore, as end-users are more sensitive
6http://scenic.princeton.edu/network20q/wiki/
index.php?title=Adaptive_Bitrate_Streaming
7http://sonnati.wordpress.com/2011/09/15/
bandwidth-is-running-out-lets-save-the-bandwidth
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CSP video [10] OSN [43] search [11] gaming*
Google 39.39% 29.6% 69.16% 20%
Microsoft 8.89% 0% 18.85% 20%
Yahoo 13.19% 4.06% 10.56% 20%
Facebook 22.01% 68.95% 0% 20%
AOL 16.52% 0% 1.43% 20%
Table 6: Customer distribution among the services of the ad-powered
CSPs (*assumption). Video briefly refers to user-centric video ser-
vices.
on the offered QoE of the online movies, we
consider 4 times increase of the post peering
traffic rates: ϕˆ(commercial − based video) =
4ϕ(commercial − based video). All the other traffic
rates remain the same, as for these services, the
premium quality means dominantly reduced latency:
ϕˆ(s) = ϕ(s), ∀s ∈ {OSN,search,gaming}.
5.2 CSPs
We consider two types of CSPs: Ad-powered CSPs,
which do not offer subscription-fee based services, i.e.,
their revenues are generated solely via advertisements:
R(s) = 0, Rˆ(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ S, and subscription-based
CSPs which charge end-users a fixed fee per month.,
although they may also earn additional advertisement-
based profits.
5.2.1 Modeling assumptions
CSP stickiness. We assume that the stickiness of
the CSPs is identical: θ(x) = θ, ∀x ∈ CSP .
Post peering advertising rates. For any type of
CSP, we assume that premium quality does not impact
the click through rates and the per click revenues of the
services: ρ(s) = ρˆ(s), a(s) = aˆ(s), ∀s ∈ S.
Finally, a CSP x is able to capture churning cus-
tomers only if it had already customers for the given
ξ service:
∑
i,s,Tξ=x
N(i, (s, T )) > 0.
5.2.2 Parameterization assumptions
Market shares for ad-powered CSPs. We rely on
the reports of comScore on the popularity of search
and video services [11] and [10], while for osn ser-
vices we use a report published by socialfresh.com [43].
More specifically for Google, we sum the popularity
of Google+ and Blogger because Blogger is owned by
Google. Owed to the lack of specific reports, we assume
a uniform distribution of customers in case of games
taking into account the fact that all the CSPs have
massive gaming services. We distribute the end users
among the CSPs for each service category, proportion-
ally to the time they spend using the given service, and
summarize our findings in Table 6.
Market shares for subscription-based CSPs. We
use a report fron Nielsen published in 2013, to distribute
U.S end-users across the considered subscription-based
CSPs [38]. Netflix holds 38% of the market, Amazon
CSP online movies [38] *
Netflix 38%
Amazon Prime 13%
Hulu Plus 6%
Table 7: Customer distribution among the services of the
subscription-based CSPs
Content provider Profit, USA (M$)
Google 294.29
AOL 2.42
Microsoft 37.15
Yahoo 23.39
Facebook 68.02
Table 8: Estimated quarterly profits of CSPs
Prime 13% and Hulu Plus 6% (see Table 7).
Profit per engagement time. Based on the 2014-
Q2 financial reports, the net income for Google [17],
Facebook [14], Yahoo [22] and AOL [3], were 3422 M$,
791 M$, 272 M$ and 28.2M$ respectively. For Microsoft
its net income was 432 M$, obtained by its 2013-Q2
financial report [32], which is the most recent financial
report that explicitly denotes the economic growth of
the Online Services Division.
These numbers correspond to a worldwide advertis-
ing audience. As the volume of CSPs’ profit is propor-
tional to the number of customers to whom the content
is shown, we assume that the profit realized in a coun-
try is proportional to the percentage of country’s Inter-
net users, i.e., we assume uniform profit sharing across
countries. By combining an Internet Live Stats report
[2] on the worldwide number of Internet users with the
U.S. Internet users in 2012 (around 254,295,536), we es-
timate the quarterly profits of CSPs in the US from the
global profit with a ratio of 0.086 (Table 8).
Turning to the subscription-based CSPs, we consider
the following providers: Netflix, Amazon Prime and
Hulu Plus. Netflix charges its existing clients for $7.99
per month, while it has recently announced to raise
its monthly fees for new streaming subscribers to
$8.99 [46]. Amazon Prime members pay $99 per year,
or $8.25 per month, while Hulu Plus costs $7.99 per
month. Furthermore as Hulu Plus earns additional
profits by showing advertisements along with its
content, we assume an average CPM of $27.61 [41],
while Netflix and Amazon do not show ads.
We use the aformentioned computed profits of the
ad-powered CSPs (Table 8) to estimate the value of the
ρ(s)a(s) product, which is the profit per engagement
time for service s. First, based on the report of IAB [5],
search accounted for 43%, while digital video for 7% of
the advertisement spendings. We assume 80–20% dis-
tribution of revenues between OSNs and gaming from
the 22% of displayed and rich media ads. Second, we
assume that all the CSPs derive the same profit per
engagement time given a specific service. Hence, we
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Service USA ($/min)
Video 0.00092
Online social networks 0.00181
Search 0.01002
Gaming 0.00092
Table 9: Estimated profit per engagement time
Access ISP Number of subscribers
Comcast 19,025,000
Time Warner 11,306,000
Cox 4,590,000
Charter 3,917,000
Cablevision 3,060,000
others 3,872,800
Table 10: Access ISPs and their market shares in the US, Q3 2012 [18]
summarize the profits of the considered CSPs and then
share the aggregate profit among the services propor-
tional to the percentages reported in the IAB study.
Finally, we divide this profit per service value with the
aggregate time the users spend in the service category
and the total number of subscribers the A-ISPs have.
We present the derived ρ(s)a(s) values in Table 9.
Estimation of stickiness for ad-powered CSPs.
We estimate the stickiness of the ad-powered CSPs us-
ing historical data on their market shares. For user-
centric video, we use data of Nielsen [37] on the top
U.S. online video sites (2009–13), while for search, we
use the reports of ComScore [9] on the U.S. search en-
gine rankings (2008–13).
For each CSP, we compute the ratio of the maximum
and the minimum of their market shares. This ratio
is a worst-case estimation of the stickiness of the CSP.
We use θ = 0.36, AOL’s ratio with respect to search, as
the lower bound of the CSPs’ loyalty, while θ = 0.80 as
upper bound (the ratio of Microsoft in case of video).
5.3 A-ISPs
We use publicly available reports on the US Internet
access market to capture the number of end users of
each A-ISP (Table 10).
5.3.1 Modelling assumptions
A-ISP stickiness. We distribute the different types
of customers across the A-ISPs uniformly, while there
is no correlation between the usage patterns of the dif-
ferent services. Hence, all the A-ISPs have initially the
same type distribution—but with different size of cus-
tomer base. In any case, the stickiness of the AISPs is
identical: β(i) = β, ∀i ∈ ISP .
5.3.2 Parameterization assumptions
A-ISPs’ number of subscribers and annual prof-
its. We derive the profit per customer for A-ISPs as
the difference between the price of a subscription and
the cost of provisioning it. A report of ITU gives the
average price of broadband access [23]: $20.0 for the US
(in 2010). The average provisioning cost of a broadband
connection was 46.45% of its price in 2010 [8]. From the
above data we compute the annual profits of the A-ISPs,
assuming that end-users pay their monthly Internet ac-
cess fee, in order to use any of the vast array of services
offered in the current Internet. As the services offered
by the considered CSPs are obviously only a subset of
the online services, we deduct that there is a portion of
the total annual A-ISPs’ profits generated due to the
presence of these CSPs and their menu of services. The
more significant is the service, based on the engagement
time end-users spent on that service (see section 5.1.2
for details), the higher is the portion of the perceived
A-ISPs’ profits that is attributable to that service. For
example, as osn services are more significant than search
(based on Table 5), it appears that a larger portion of
the total annual A-ISPs’ profits is generated due to the
presence of osn services in comparison with the profits
due to search services.
Estimation of A-ISPs’ stickiness. We estimate the
stickiness of A-ISPs using Leichtman Research Group’s
historical data on the US broadband market (2009–
13) [18]. For each A-ISP, we compute the ratio of
the maximum and the minimum of their market shares
based on the historical data. This ratio is a worst-
case estimation of the stickiness of the A-ISP. We use
β = 0.77, Cablevision’s ratio, as the lower bound of the
A-ISPs’ loyalty, while β = 0.95 as upper bound (the
ratio of Time Warner).
5.4 General
5.4.1 Modelling assumptions
Market conditions. Initially, we assume that the
market lacks premium peering agreements: q(i, x) =
0, ∀i ∈ ISP, ∀x ∈ CSP , and that that both AISPs and
CSPs face the same transit cost: t(i) = t(x) = t, ∀i ∈
ISP, ∀x ∈ CSP .
5.4.2 Parameterization assumptions
Peering and transit costs. Based on fiercewire-
less.com [15], we use 1K $ per Gbps/month as transit
cost. We estimate the cost of peering based on the
publicly advertised prices of an Internet eXchange
Point (IXP) [13]. Specifically, the yearly fees are:
yearly fee of $2700, and fees $4000 (FE), $4500 (GB)
and $14000 (10G) per port per year. We assume that
in case of a premium peering agreement, at least one
additional port should be allocated at each parties
(i.e., direct peering).
6. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION
In this section we feed data from Sect. 5 into our
model, in order to investigate qualitatively the volume
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and the direction of payments in the U.S. Internet mar-
ket. Initially, we concentrate on the Comcast-Google
pair (largest A-ISP and ad-powered CSP, respectively),
assuming that they are the first to introduce premium
peering into the U.S. market. Our experiments reveal
that three parameters have the most pronounced im-
pact on the prices of premium peering: Namely, (i) the
stickiness of the A-ISPs (β), (ii) the stickiness of the
CSPs (θ), and (iii) the magnitude of the increase of the
engagement times (aρ), affect the characteristics of the
ecosystem the most. We demonstrate this by imple-
menting several market scenarios, starting from simple
ones and gradually introducing more parameters. Af-
ter showing in what way the various model parameters
affect the derived premium peering payments, we con-
clude with the equivalent price per Gbps per month for
each service separately and compare it with the current
transit and paid peering prices. Moreover, in order to
get a more integrated view of how our model and the
predicted payments correlate with actual market strate-
gies, we extend our study with the Comcast-Netflix
pair, as they have recently agreed on a paid peering
deal.
6.1 The effect of engagement time increase &
customers churn
We initially assume that only one service is included
in the bilateral premium peering agreement, either
search or user-centric video. This permits us to derive
interesting conclusions around individual services.
Later on we generalize and consider all services in
parallel.
Zero churn on both sides of the market. If cus-
tomers are fully loyal to both their ISP and CSP, then
a premium peering between Comcast and Google is not
going to attract any customers from their respective
competitors. The only benefit of the premium peering
will be an increase of engagement time for their existing
customers. While flat monthly payments do not permit
Comcast to monetize this increase of engagement time,
Google is in position to earn additional profits, and this
induces the Nash bargaining solution to transfer some of
the benefit over to Comcast. The exact amount depends
on the magnitude of increase of the engagement time.
We examine two cases, a conservative one, in which the
engagement time for video increases by 7.48% and for
search by 0.2% (as per the reports of [26, 49, 25]), and
an optimistic one, in which the engagement time dou-
bles as a result of the establishment of premium peering.
Of course the interesting case here is the second, since
there is little sense in discussing payments if the pre-
mium peering has a small impact on end user QoE and
engagement time.
Under the conservative estimation, the monthly pay-
ment from Google to Comcast for video is $11814, while
for search is $2673, reflecting the fact that the assumed
increase of engagement time is much higher for user-
centric video. In the optimistic case, the monthly pay-
ment for video is $0.18M and for search $1.17M. Notice
that in this case, search yields higher payments than
user-centric video. Having equalized the increase of en-
gagement time for both services (doubled), search is
carrying a much higher $ revenue per engagement time
increase than video ($0.01 per extra minute for search
versus $0.00092 per extra minute for user-centric video
according to Table 9).
Customer churn on one side of the market.
Next we demonstrate the effect of customer churn on
the direction and the volume of payments.
We start by considering non-zero customer churn on
the content side of the market, while keeping the ac-
cess side churn free. This means that by establishing a
premium peering, Google can attract a part of its com-
petitors’ customers, whereas Comcast cannot. Having
two sources of extra benefit, induces the Nash solution
to transfer a larger amount of money from Google to
Comcast (for both search and video), compared to the
previous case in which the increased engagement time
was the only extra benefit. The exact amount depends
on the joint effect of the engagement time increase,
and loyalty of end-users towards their CSP parame-
ters. For example, when the CSPs’ loyalty is equal to
0.4, the monthly payment for user-centric video services
from Google to Comcast is $0.32M, while for CSP’s
loyalty=0.8, it is down to $0.23M. In the second case,
Google can attract fewer customers from its competi-
tors and thus its benefit, and consequent payment to
Comcast is smaller (both amounts are derived under
the optimistic case of engagement times increase).
Next we invert the picture and consider non-zero
churn on the ISP side, and zero churn on the content
market side. Now Comcast is able to gain a portion
of its competitors’ customers, while Google benefits
only through the increase of engagement time of its
existing customers. The direction of payment now is
not strictly from CSP to ISP but it can be the other
way around if the incoming churn of the ISP is more
beneficial than the increase of engagement time for
the CSP. For example, under the conservative case
for the increase of engagement time mentioned before
[26, 49, 25], Comcast has to pay Google, for all but the
highest values of A-ISP loyalty as depicted in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Monthly payments transferred between Comcast and
Google, for zero CSP churn, while customer churn may occur on the
access side. Comcast has to pay Google, unless the A-ISP’s loyalty is
very high.
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In the optimistic case, however, where the engage-
ment time doubles, Google’s profits mask the profits of
Comcast from incoming churn and thus the payments
are from the former to the latter. For example, the
monthly payment for user-centric video from Google
to Comcast is $0.10M for A-ISP loyalty equal to 0.4.
For ISP loyalty equal to 0.8 the payment increases to
$0.15M, since in this case Comcast attracts fewer cus-
tomers from competitors and thus the Nash solution
assigns it a bigger chunk of Google’s benefits from in-
creased engagement.
Customer churn on both sides of the market.
We now assume that both Google and Comcast are in
position to attract new customers as a result of their
premium peering agreement. We still consider a single
service, either search or user-centric video.
CSP’s loyalty M$(search) M$(user-centric video)
0.0 1.77 0.34
0.2 1.69 0.29
0.4 1.59 0.25
0.6 1.48 0.20
0.8 1.38 0.15
1.0 1.27 0.11
Table 11: Monthly payments from Google to Comcast for A-ISP’s
loyalty equal to 0.5. Customers’ loyalty towards their CSP impacts
the realized payments.
The direction and volume of payments depend on
the interplay of all three parameters (engagement time
increase and two loyalty parameters). Fixing A-ISP
loyalty to 0.5, Table 11 shows that for an optimistic
end-users’ engagement times increase, payments are
from Google to Comcast but decrease as the loyalty
to CSP increases. The reason is that Google attracts
customers of its competitors, alongside a significant
increase of its advertising revenues. These benefits
outweigh the benefits of Comcast from incoming churn,
and thus the Nash bargaining imposes payments
from Google to Comcast. However, as the number
of customers attracted by Google decreases, due to
increased CSPs’ loyalty, the monthly payments to
Comcast decrease as well.
Figure 5 covers the case of pessimistic increase of en-
gagement time. Now the extra advertising profits for
Google are small and this reduces the volume of pay-
ments. At a certain point of CSP loyalty, the bene-
fits from incoming churn in the ISP and CSP counter-
balance each other, leading to small payments. A free-
peering agreement make sense in this case.
The general case: churn in both sides and mul-
tiple types of service. Having examined progres-
sively the effects of engagement time increase and churn
on individual services, we next move into the more gen-
eral and realistic case, in which multiple types service
(search, video, osn and gaming) are impacted by the
premium peering.
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Figure 5: Monthly payments for search and user-centric video for
low engagement time increase. In most cases Google pays Comcast,
although a free-peering agreement could be proved fair for fully CSPs’
loyalty.
Qualitatively, all our previous observations remain
valid also under this more general case. The volume of
payments, however, is now higher in absolute value since
it is the result of a summation of multiple side-payments
for each one of the considered services. Instead of doing
a parameter space exploration with respect to loyalty,
we will now attempt to derive payments under loyalty
levels extracted from the real US market.
We compute the monthly payments between Comcast
and Google for the four combinations of the extracted
loyalty bounds (Sect. 5). We use θ = 0.36, as a lower
bound of the CSPs’ loyalty, and θ = 0.80 as an upper
bound. Likewise, we assume β = 0.77, and β = 0.95 as
lower and upper A-ISPs’ loyalty bounds respectively.
The results of Table 12 indicate monthly payments
from Google towards Comcast in the order of $8.62M–
$9.8M under all combinations of loyalty for the opti-
mistic increase of engagement time. In Set. 6.4 we trans-
late these payments into equivalent bandwidth prices.
An important observation on these payments is that
they are actually lower bounds on the amount that the
CSP should pay. The reason is that our parameteriza-
tion in Sect. 5 has considered only interconnection costs
for the A-ISP but no further costs from the increased
traffic inside the access and metro networks. Using a
CDN co-located with customers (e.g., at DSLAMs) can
effectively serve the traffic with little impact on the ac-
cess (beyond the last mile). In that case, both the A-
ISP and the CSP would have close to zero IXP costs,
whereas the A-ISP would have to incur the costs of pro-
visioning the CDN infrastructure. We have executed
this scenario using a CDN cost of $4K per Gbps per
month.8 Table 13 shows that the payments from Google
to Comcast are somewhat higher for this superior ser-
vice ( $9.07M–$10.02M per month).
6.2 Impact of A-ISP’s market share
Next we investigate the impact of the size of an A-
ISP’s customer base on its paid peering relationship
with CSPs. Hence, we compare the previous results
involving Comcast and Google with a new set of re-
8http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2012/09/
cdn-pricing-stable-survey-data-shows-pricing-down-15-this-year.
html
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θ θ
β 10.1 $ 9.49 $
β 9.58 $ 8.92 $
Table 12: Million $ paid
by Google to Comcast (per
month), without CDN services
θ θ
β 10.8 $ 10.1 $
β 10.3 $ 9.6 $
Table 13: Million $ paid
by Google to Comcast (per
month), with CDN services
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Figure 6: Volume of monthly fees for Comcast-Google and
Cablevision-Google pairs, against multiple values of CSP’s loyalty.
The large A-ISP always gets the money, while the direction of the
money flow between Google and Cablevision strongly depends on the
A-ISP’s loyalty.
sults between Cablevision and Google. Comcast is the
biggest player in the US residential broadband marke,
while Cablevision is the smallest. In both cases we as-
sume that no previous premium peering agreements ex-
ist in the local market.
As Comcast already holds most of the market, a
smaller A-ISP has much more to gain from a premium
peering relationship with an important CSP. There-
fore, whereas before payments went consistently from
Google to Comcast, in the case of Cablevision, the ISP
can pay the CSP (for low ISP loyalty that permits for
maximum incoming churn) and even if it gets paid
(under high ISP loyalty that permits less incoming
churn), the volume of payment is significantly smaller
than the corresponding one for Comcast under similar
market conditions. Figure 6 presents concrete $ values
for the above observations for our US case study.
Notice that our results verify real market trends that
have large A-ISPs receiving payments from CSPs for
direct peering whereas small A-ISPs offering it for free.
6.3 Timing matters
We implement a scenario where Comcast is the last
A-ISP to agree with Google, and compare it with the
case in which Comcast and Google are the first to es-
tablish a premium peering agreement. If Comcast acts
in the first place (aggressive peering), then it is able
to attract a significant portion of its competitors’ cus-
tomers, while late agreements (conservative peering) is
more of a defensive measure for retaining its customers,
as its competitors have already exploited the privileges
of premium peering deals. If this is the case, Comcast’s
customer base has been decreased due to the migration
of some of its end-users to another, more aggressive, ac-
cess provider. Hence the post peering profits of Comcast
will be smaller in comparison with the case in which it
acts proactively, as depicted in Fig. 7.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
CSP loyalty
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
M $
conservative peering
aggressive peering
Figure 7: Comcast’s monthly profits for an aggressive vs a conserva-
tive A-ISP’s peering policy. The post peering profits are decreasing
as Comcast becomes more reluctant to establish the premium peering
deal.
Nevertheless, Google is able to increase its customers’
population by attracting a portion of Comcast’s end-
users, which used to interact with another CSP, before
the premium peering deal. Hence the direction of pay-
ments is still from the CSP to the A-ISP. Interestingly
enough, the amount of payments from Google to Com-
cast for the conservative peering policy is higher in com-
parison with the aggressive one. This is justified by the
fact that as Comcast delays the premium peering deal
and hence it is not in position to attract new customers,
Google has to pay higher premium peering fees in order
to offer the appropriate incentives to Comcast to accept
the deal (see Fig. 8).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
CSP loyalty
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Figure 8: Monthly charges from Comcast to Google for an aggressive
vs a conservative A-ISP’s peering policy.
6.4 Comparison with real bandwidth prices
Up to now, we have used as metric the monthly pay-
ment (in $) from one party to the other. Next we will
compute an equivalent price per Gbps per month for
each one of the considered services. The transformation
involves just a division of the actual payment reported
before, by the extra volume of data transmitted because
of the premium peering. The purpose of this study is to
see how our payments correlate with actual bandwidth
prices in the market.
Based on our most realistic scenario, and assuming
that the pair Comcast-Google is the first to establish a
premium peering deal, we demonstrate in Table 14 the
equivalent price per Gbps per month for each service
(for a significant engagement times’ increase).
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CSP’s loyalty user-centric video search osn gaming
0.0 0.96 1355 69 0.22
0.2 0.87 1276 62 0.19
0.4 0.77 1196 54 0.17
0.6 0.67 1116 47 0.14
0.8 0.56 1035 38 0.11
1.0 0.45 954 30 0.08
Table 14: K $ per Gbps/month transferred between Comcast and
Google for A-ISP’s loyalty equal to 0.95.
Our first important observation is that the premium
peering prices that we compute for video are reasonably
close to real bandwidth price in the market. Indeed,
assuming that paid peering prices are in many cases
set to less that the half the price of the corresponding
transit prices 9, and based on current market reports,
which claim that transit prices in 2013 have dropped
below 1 K $ per Gbps/month [15] , we observe that
our results are in the same order of magnitude with
both the current transit and paid peering prices.
The fact that video premium prices match the above
real bandwidth prices is very important for the validity
of our model, as video dominates traffic on the Internet.
Therefore, if the model and its parameterization are
sufficiently representative of reality, then the predicted
prices for video should correlate with the real prices for
amorphous (i.e., independent of service) bandwidth on
the market, which seems to be the case according to our
results.
The next column of Table 14, which corresponds to
search, leads us to a second important observation.
The predicted fair prices for search are several orders
of magnitude higher than the corresponding prices for
video and the real transit and paid peering prices of the
month. This might appear surprising but it is actually
consistent with everything else. Video has high volume
and low supporting revenue stream, whereas search has
low volume and a high supporting revenue stream. A
direct consequence of this observation is that currently
CSPs are paying ISPs only for the bandwidth heavy and
low profit service (video), but get to enjoy the delivery
of their high profit service (search) almost for free.
In the following subsection, we like to examine the
stability of our main conclusion, e.g., that CSPs tend
to pay only for the high volume services, by investigat-
ing the derived bandwidth prices for commercial-based
video services. We focus on the Comcast-Netflix pair,
and we again assume that they are the first A-ISP and
subscription-based CSP to establish a premium peering
deal. In the following subsection, we like to examine
the stability of our main conclusion–that CSPs tend to
pay only for the high volume services, by investigat-
ing the derived bandwidth prices for commercial-based
video services. We focus on the Comcast-Netflix pair,
and we again assume that they are the first A-ISP and
9See for example: http://drpeering.net
CSP’s loyalty commercial based video
0.0 0.18
0.2 0.15
0.4 0.12
0.6 0.08
0.8 0.05
1.0 0.01
Table 15: K $ per Gbps/month paid by Netflix to Comcast for A-ISP’s
loyalty equal to 0.95.
CSP pair establish a premium peering deal.
6.5 Bandwidth prices for the Comcast-Netflix
pair
The Comcast-Netflix pair is of special interest, as
they have recently signed a paid-peering agreement. Al-
though there are several (and in many cases controver-
sial) reports attempting to estimate the exact band-
width price derived by that deal 10, the involved par-
ties have not published any official report of their agree-
ment. As we have already investigated in what way the
various model parameters affect the direction and the
amount of payments, we proceed to the estimation of
the $ per Gbps per month, transferred between Com-
cast and Netflix, and present our results in Table 15.
Our results summarized in Table 15, are lower than
the predicted bandwidth prices for user-centric video
(see Table 14), and consequently lower than the cur-
rent transit and paid peering prices. This observation
is a natural outcome of our model, as Netflix is not
an ad-powered CSP and hence can not be benefited by
the increase of the end-users’ engagement times. Both
Comcast and Netflix have only one source of additional
income i.e., the customers’ churn on each side of the
market, after the premium peering deal.
The bandwidth prices, presented in Table 15, do not
take into account that a paid peering agreement be-
tween an A-ISP and a CSP, includes far more complex
investment decisions than a simple acquisition of the
dedicated ports and links. As highlighted in [?], di-
rect interconnection agreements require additional in-
vestments, capacity upgrades and more sophisticated
routing policies especially by the A-ISP, which owns
the most capital-intensive part of the network. Indeed,
the direct interconnection between two providers is ul-
timately an agreement to share their entire infrastruc-
tures, and not simply a link and some router ports. Mo-
tivated by this observation and similarly to our general
case analysis, we present in ( Table 16), our bandwidth
prices for the Comcast-Netflix pair, when the A-ISP
uses CDN services in the last-mile, in order to deliver
the content effectively to the end-users.
In this case the predicted bandwidth prices are
higher, that without the use of CDNs, and mush closer
10http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/02/heres-comcast-
netflix-deal-structured-numbers.html
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CSP’s loyalty commercial based video
0.0 0.31
0.2 0.29
0.4 0.27
0.6 0.24
0.8 0.21
1.0 0.19
Table 16: K $ per Gbps/month paid by Netflix to Comcast for A-ISP’s
loyalty equal to 0.95, with CDN services
to the empirical rule, that paid peering prices are half
the price of the transit fees.
Another interesting observation is that the payments
(as $ per Gbps/month) transferred from Netflix to Com-
cast are less sensitive to the CSP stickiness, in compar-
ison with the user-centric video case. This is justified
by the fact that Netflix is by far the dominant player in
the subscription-based video market, and hence the in-
coming population after the premium peering deal will
be any case relatively small. Consequently, as the CSP
customer churn will be negligible, it won’t affect signif-
icantly the derived payments.
The aforementioned conclusions substantiate our
claim that per service peering might provide a tran-
scendent framework on how a fair peering price could
be determined. In fact, there is an ongoing work on
enabling "application-specific peering", by deploying
Software Defined Networking (SDN) at the various
Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) [?]. This architecture
is aiming to provide each ISP (either A-ISP or CSP)
the flexibility to express direct expression of more
sophisticated interconnection strategies, such as the
per service peering. Hence, our work provides another
perspective on the emergence of application-specific
peering, by presenting a quantitative analysis of
the endogenous asymmetries of the various types of
services.
Finally, based on our analysis, we have developed
PeeringCalc, a web-site that permits users to eval-
uate our model, on their own case-study. (URL:
http://peeringcalc.nes.aueb.gr)
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The main disagreement between CSPs and A-ISPs is
who eventually benefits more from it, with CSPs claim-
ing that improved QoE benefits the A-ISP via positive
incoming churn from competitors, and A-ISP complain-
ing about the high costs for delivering it, and the imbal-
ance between their flattening revenues and the higher
margins of CSPs. In this work we have attempted to
create a model that connects directly all the ingredi-
ents of the tussle: the profits from incoming churn in
both sides of the market, the profitability of improved
QoE, per service characteristics, including loyalty, and
the costs of interconnection (peering, CDN, etc.). Un-
like all previous work in the area our model derives ac-
tual bandwidth prices that can be contrasted with real
bandwidth prices on the market and thus serve as a
benchmark for actual negotiations and/or regulation.
Our model cannot obviously capture every detail of
reality but we have put special effort in consulting with
industry insiders (both in ISP and CSP side, as well as
regulators) to make sure that we capture at least the
basic dynamics of the tussle. The fact that we output
prices that follow intuition qualitatively, and, in some
(important) cases match real bandwidth prices from the
market, is in our opinion an indication that the model
is useful and moving to the right direction. There are of
course many improvements that we would like to pur-
sue as well as additional case studies to be conducted.
For example, we would like to encode more detailed
cost structures to the model and additional data around
them. Our definition of loyalty can obviously benefit
from additional experimentation in the area and simi-
larly for the the engagement time parameter. In terms
of case studies, we are currently developing a web-site
that will permit actual stakeholders to populate our
model with their own data. We are also considering
adapting the model to the wireless broadband market
and consider the effects of competition where user prices
have more complex structures.
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